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Abstract
The main focus of this paper is the analysis of reported level of (dis)trust towards the Ombudsmen
in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, based on the findings of CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer survey.
During the period from 2008 to 2013, trust towards the respective country’s Ombudsman declined
in all three countries. Both bivariate and regression analysis suggest that the nature of (dis)trust
towards the Ombudsmen is different in each country, but in all cases it is positively correlated with
reported trust towards major governing bodies. Although the respective Laws are clear that this
is an independent institution, our finding suggests that, in public perception, Public Defenders
represent the government – and this perception may hinder efficiency of this institution to serve as
promoters of “human rights culture” in their countries.
1. Introduction
In the countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), the awareness about
human rights and the mechanisms of their protection have historically been rather low, hence,
“human rights culture” is still far from strong in these societies. Although institutions of Public
Defenders (or Ombudsmen) have been established in all these countries after the breakup of the
Soviet Union, and respective legal mechanisms have been created, this did not yet lead to major
changes in public knowledge, perceptions and attitudes. Just under a third of the population of the
South Caucasus countries reported in CRRC’s 2013 Caucasus Barometer survey1 trust towards
the Ombudsman of the respective country, with 20% to 30% answering “Don’t know” to this
question. Although the establishment and very existence of the institutions of Public Defenders
represent important steps forward towards ensuring chances of protection of human rights in these
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post-Soviet countries, the data suggest these institutions have not yet proven to be as efficient as
democratic reformers were hoping they would.
The main focus of this paper is, however, not a detailed account of the activities of the Om-
budsmen and their offices in the South Caucasus countries, but, rather, analysis of public attitudes
towards Public Defenders – primarily, level of (dis)trust towards the Ombudsmen in Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia. The paper will analyze how similar, or how different is it in each of
these countries, and how it correlates with the population’s major demographic characteristics
and democratic attitudes. Detailed background information about the institution will be presented
based on the Georgian case. General information about functions and performance of the Public
Defender (PD) of Georgia and his Office will be provided in the first part of the paper, followed by
description of methodology of data collection and analysis, and findings for each of the countries.
2. The Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia: Functions and
Performance
1996 Organic Law on Public Defender of Georgia provided the necessary legal basis for the
establishment of this institution. Importantly, by 1996, post-Soviet Georgia already had some
experience of institutional defense of human rights: in 1992, very soon after this former Soviet
republic has proclaimed its independence, a governmental Committee on Interethnic Relations
and Protection of Human Rights was established. This Committee served as the basis for the
establishment of the institution of Public Defender in 1996. Compared to the mandate of the
Committee, though, the rights and possibilities of the Public Defender are much broader.
In the period between 1997 and 2015, Georgia had five Public Defenders. The main function
of the Public Defender, commonly referred to as the Ombudsman, in Georgia is to oversee
the observance of human rights in the country. This includes providing assistance to the
citizens who report violation of their human rights; analysis of the country’s legislation,
ensuring its compliance with international standards; and advice to the government on the
steps to be taken to protect human rights. According to the official information, “The Public
Defender of Georgia exercises the functions of the National Preventive Mechanism, envisaged
by the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Ombudsman of Georgia undertakes
educational activities in the field of human rights and freedoms, and lodges complaints in
the Constitutional Court of Georgia in case the human rights and freedoms envisaged in the
chapter II of the Georgian constitution are violated by a normative act. The Public Defender
is further authorized to exercise the Amicus Curiae function in Common Courts and the
Constitutional Court of Georgia. Powers and functions of the Office of Public Defender
(PDO) are defined in the Organic Law on Public Defender of Georgia of 1996”2.
Importantly, the Public Defender represents an independent institution, and is bound only by
the Constitution of Georgia and relevant national and international legislation. The Ombudsman
cannot be a member of any political party, or be involved in any type of political activity. The PD
is elected by the Parliament of Georgia and both him/her and his/her office are funded by the state
budget. The Ombudsman him/herself enjoys personal immunity. Any attempt to interfere with or
influence the Public Defender’s work is a crime.3
The Law requires the Ombudsman both to react on the cases of violation of human rights and
to be proactive in monitoring how human rights are protected in the country. The number of
2 http://ombudsman.ge/en/public-defender/mandati
3 http://ombudsman.ge/uploads/other/2/2058.pdf
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applications received by the Ombudsman in 2014 is reported to be 7272,4 an impressive increase
compared to 5457 applications registered by the Office in 2013.
All services provided by the Public Defender to the citizens are free. In order to make its services
more accessible to the population, the institution has seven regional offices in different regions of
Georgia5 (see Map 1).
Map 1: Locations of the Public Defender’s Regional Offices, Georgia (2015)
The institution strives to be actively involved in international collaboration, and is a member of
a number of associations active in the field. Since 2013, PD’s International Advisory Board has
been created in order to strengthen the protection of human rights in Georgia. The members of the
Board are to share their knowledge and experience in the field, and assist the Public Defender’s
Office in institutional development. Also in 2013, the Office underwent Accreditation under the
International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights.
Hence, in Georgia, the institution of the Public Defender has a solid legal basis, with a mandate
and resources allowing it to protect human rights and help strengthen the “human rights culture” in
the country. The following sections of this paper will demonstrate how this institution is viewed by
the population.
3. Methodology
Annual Caucasus Barometer (CB) surveys have been conducted by CRRC offices6 in Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia since 20047, as part of a larger project funded by the Carnegie Corporation
of New York. Findings for the period from 2008 through 2013 are used in this paper, with major
focus on the 2013 findings.8
Caucasus Barometer is the only survey regularly conducted across the region employing the
same survey instrument and a comparable methodology. The questions focus on major issues of
4 http://ombudsman.ge/en/public-defender/mandati (p. 6)
5 This overview covers the period until 2015. Two more regional offices were established after that, in Ozurgeti in
November 2016 and in Mestia in July 2017.
6 http://www.crrccenters.org/20122/Documentation
7 The surveys were not nationally representative until 2006.
8 The survey was not conducted in 2014 and 2016. In 2015 and 2017, the survey was conducted in Armenia and
Georgia, but not in Azerbaijan.
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social and political transformation of the countries of the South Caucasus, including development
of democratic values and level of trust towards major social and political institutions.
Caucasus Barometer surveys adult (18+) population of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,
excluding population living in conflict regions (Nagorno Karabakh, Nakhichevan, South Ossetia
and Abkhazia). The interviews are conducted in Armenian in Armenia; in Azerbaijani in Azerbaijan;
and in Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani in Georgia9. Through 2013, PAPI (Paper-and-Pencil)
face-to-face interviewing was employed; CRRC introduced CAPI (Computer Assisted Personal
Interviewing) in 2014.
Multistage cluster sampling with preliminary stratification is employed for Caucasus Barometer
surveys. Around 2200 interviews are completed per country annually; fieldwork takes place in Fall
(October-November). The results of the surveys are representative for the entire population of each
country, excluding territories affected by military conflicts, and are also representative at the levels
of for the population of the capitals, other urban settlements and rural settlements.
The 2013 wave of the Caucasus Barometer survey took place between the 3rd and 27th of October
in Georgia, between the 26th of October and the 15th of November 15 in Armenia, and between the
1st of November and the 16th of December 16 in Azerbaijan. 2133 respondents were interviewed
in Georgia, 1832 – in Armenia and 1988 – in Azerbaijan, with response rates being, respectively,
69%, 65% and 82%. The data was weighted for the analysis performed for this paper.
Important to note, the Caucasus Barometer surveys are in open access at CRRC’s online
data analysis platform10 Datasets in SPSS and STATA formats, as well as survey documentation
(questionnaires, fieldwork reports) can be downloaded and analyzed by all interested researchers.
In the Findings section below, results of bivariate analysis are presented first, mostly analyzing
the correlation between the variables of interest, followed by logistic regression models run
separately for each country in order to understand the predictors of trust towards Ombudsmen of
the respective countries.
4. Findings
During the period from 2008 to 2013, reported trust11 towards the respective country’s Ombuds-
man declined from 58% to 28% in Georgia; from 49% to 31% in Armenia, and from 45% to 19%
in Azerbaijan. Interestingly, reported distrust has remained rather stable in each country through
this period, at around 8% in Georgia and around 22% in Armenia and Azerbaijan. A detailed look
at the demographic profile of those trusting and distrusting the Ombudsman is the first step to
understand what explains declining trust towards this institution12.
4.1. Georgia
In Georgia, the share of those who report trusting the Ombudsman is almost three times
bigger than share of those who report distrusting him (28% and 10%, respectively), while the
majority report indifference (41% “neither trusting nor distrusting” the Ombudsman, and another
20% answering “Don’t know”). Reported trust towards the Ombudsman does not differ by the
population’s major demographic characteristics, such as gender, marital status, type of settlement
9 In Georgia, the respondents living in multiethnic primary sampling units can choose the language of the interview.
10 http://www.caucasusbarometer.org/en/
11 The Caucasus Barometer surveys measure trust towards major social and political institutions using a 5-point scale.
Answer options “Fully trust” and “Trust” are combined here.
12 The rest of the paper is based on CB 2013 findings.
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the person lives in, his/her employment status or household’s economic condition. Compared with
representatives of younger age groups, the level of trust, however, tends to decrease among those
who are older, but the strengths of correlation is rather weak (Pearson’s R = -0.110)13. Correlation
between the level of trust towards the Ombudsman and the highest level of education achieved by
individuals is slightly stronger (Spearman’s correlation = 0.165), suggesting that those with higher
levels of education tend to report a higher level of trust towards the Ombudsman.
More obvious differences are observed among those who have positive vs. negative opinions
about the political developments in the country. Those who assess these developments positively
(i.e. think that the politics is definitely or mainly going in the right direction) tend to report higher
levels of trust towards the Ombudsman. Among those who think that politics in Georgia is going
“mainly in the right direction,” 38% report trusting the Ombudsman, while 6% report distrusting
him.
Similarly, those who think that people in Georgia are treated fairly by the government tend
to report higher trust towards the Ombudsman. This suggests that trust towards the Ombudsman
in Georgia is strongly correlated with support for the way the country is developing – and, most
probably, with support for the current government. Indeed, rather high positive correlations
are observed between the variable measuring trust towards the Ombudsman, on the one hand,
and variables measuring trust towards the Parliament and the Executive government (Cabinet of
Ministers) of the country (Spearman’s correlations being, respectively, .358 and .320). Interestingly
though, correlation with the variable measuring trust towards the President is much weaker, with
Spearman’s correlation =.109. This is not entirely unexpected, as the President currently has less
executive power in the country, while the relationship of the current President and his administration
with the Cabinet of Ministers and the Parliament are often problematic.
More importantly, though, the correlation of the variable measuring trust towards the Ombuds-
man in Georgia with the variables measuring democratic attitudes in general is much weaker. A
relatively strong correlation is observed with the variable measuring support for the statement
whether it is important or not for a good citizen to be critical towards the government (Spear-
man’s correlation = .210). It may be the case that the public opinion does not necessarily see the
Ombudsman’s office as one of the major democratic institutions.
In order to understand how, if at all, the discussed variables influence the population’s trust
towards the Ombudsman, logistic regression was run. Of the demographic variables in the equation
(age, gender, settlement type, marital status, employment, and highest level of education achieved),
all were statistically significant, but the impact on reported trust towards the Ombudsman was not
very big – with the exception of settlement type. The rural population was 1.5 times more likely to
report trust towards the Ombudsman.
Of the variables measuring attitudes to democracy14, all were, again, significant, and had stronger
effect on reported trust towards the Ombudsman. Those reporting that “democracy is preferable to
any other kind of government” were 1.6 times more likely to report trust towards the Ombudsman,
as were those who believed that politics in Georgia was developing in the right direction. Those
who stated that Georgia is currently a democracy were 1.3 times more likely to report trust towards
the Ombudsman. The latter finding suggests the answers may be influenced by social desirability
bias, and this risk is further enhanced by the fact that those who actually share democratic beliefs (in
case of this particular model – those who believe that it is important for a good citizen to be critical
towards the government) do not seem to differ in their reported trust towards the Ombudsman in
13 In cases of all tables presented in this paper, correlations between the variables are significant.
14 There were four such variables in the model: importance for a good citizen to be critical towards the government;
assessment of the way political processes develop in the country (“right” direction vs “wrong” direction); attitudes
towards democracy as a political system; and assessment of level of democratization of Georgia.
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comparison to the rest of the population (Table 1).
4.2. Armenia
The reported level of trust towards the Ombudsman has been relatively stable in Armenia after
2009. In 2013, 31% of the population reported trusting the Ombudsman (with only 9% reporting
“fully trusting” him), while 24% reported distrusting him. The share of those who answered “Don’t
know” fluctuated between 15% and 22% in the period between 2009 and 2013, with the smallest
share (15%) recorded in 2013.
In 2013, a relatively weak correlation (Spearman correlation =.121) between reported trust
towards the Ombudsman and age can be observed in Armenia, while no differences are observed
by other major demographic characteristics – including settlement type, which is an unexpected
finding. The correlation between trust towards the Ombudsman and level of education is weaker
in Armenia, when compared to the same correlation in Azerbaijan and Georgia, which is also a
rather unexpected finding. Overall, it is more difficult to describe the demographic characteristics
of those trusting (or distrusting) the Ombudsman in Armenia, than it is in Azerbaijan and Georgia.
In Armenia, reported trust towards the Ombudsman is correlated with trust towards other major
governing bodies (the President, Parliament and the Executive government), though the strength
of correlation is moderate (Spearman correlations are .261, .257 and .246, respectively). There is
a very strong correlation between trust towards the Ombudsman and trust towards the European
Union (Spearman correlation =.522), suggesting that the institution of the Ombudsman (and,
possibly, the very concept of human rights’ protection) is perceived to be part of European values
and/or way of life.
Those Armenians who believe that people are treated fairly by the government tend to have
highest trust towards the Ombudsman, and vice versa; however, the correlation between the
variables is not very strong (Spearman correlation =.189). Trust towards the Ombudsman in
Armenia does not seem to differ by variables measuring democratic attitudes.
The same regression model run based on the Armenian data leads to rather different findings.
First of all, education is no longer significant in this model (Table 2). Of the demographic variables,
gender and employment status seem to have the biggest impact to reported trust towards the
Ombudsman: men are 1.3 times more likely than women to report trust towards the Ombudsman,
and so are those who are employed. The variables measuring attitudes to democracy, although
statistically significant, do not seem to affect trust towards the Ombudsman, except the variable
measuring opinions regarding whether politics in Armenia is developing in the right or wrong
direction. Those who think that the politics in Armenia is developing in the right direction are
much less likely to report trust towards the Ombudsman.
4.3. Azerbaijan
In Azerbaijan, the share of the population reporting trust towards the Ombudsman is almost
equal to the share of those who report distrusting him (19% and 21%, respectively). This finding
is relatively constant for the period from 2009 to 2013. The share of those who answered “Don’t
know” in 2013 was, however, the highest of the three countries at 29%, with a further 2% refusing
to answer this question. Hence, almost a third of the population either could not or would not
answer this question.
In Azerbaijan, reported trust towards the Ombudsman does not seem to have been influenced
by major demographic characteristics of the population. The only exceptions are differences by
settlement type and, to slightly lesser extent, level of education. People living in the capital, on
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the one hand, report trusting the Ombudsman twice less often compared to the national average
(14% vs 28%), and the population of rural settlements, on the other hand, trusts the Ombudsman
more compared to the urban population (Spearman correlation =.190). Similarly to the Georgian
findings, those with higher levels of education tend to report higher trust towards the Ombudsman.
Although the 2013 Azerbaijani data does not show differences in trust towards the country’s
Ombudsman based on positive vs. negative opinions about the political developments in the
country, the correlation between answers to the question about trust towards the Ombudsman
and assessments whether people are or are not treated fairly by the government is rather strong
(Spearman correlation =.224). Those who disagree with the opinion that people in Azerbaijan are
treated fairly by the government tend not to trust the Ombudsman, while those who agree with this
opinion report a higher level of trust towards him.
Interestingly, the strength of the correlation between trust towards the Ombudsman, on the one
hand, and other major governing bodies (the President, Parliament and the Executive government),
on the other hand, is weaker in Azerbaijan compared to Georgia. Of these three governing bodies,
trust towards the executive government is most strongly correlated with the trust towards the
Ombudsman (Spearman correlation =.219). Similar to the finding in Georgia, trust towards the
Ombudsman in Azerbaijan is most weakly correlated with trust towards the President (Spearman
correlation =.100), but reasons for this findings are not entirely clear, given the strength of this
institution in Azerbaijan.
Trust towards the Ombudsman in Azerbaijan is not highly correlated with variables measuring
democratic attitudes, which suggests that different relationship between attitudes towards the
Ombudsman and democratic attitudes may be in place in Azerbaijan and Georgia.
Of the demographic variables in the logistic regression model run based on the Azerbaijani data,
education and gender have the biggest impact on reported trust towards the Ombudsman. Quite
similar to the Armenian finding, men are 1.2 times more likely than women to report trust towards
the Ombudsman. Azerbaijan is the only of the South Caucasus countries where impact of the
education is evident: those having secondary education are 1.6 times more likely to report trust
towards the Ombudsman.
Much like the Georgian case, those Azerbaijanis who report that “democracy is preferable to
any other kind of government” are 1.3 times more likely to report trust towards the Ombudsman.
On the contrary, those who think that Azerbaijan is currently a democracy are much less likely to
report trust towards the Ombudsman (Table 3).
5. Conclusions
As the Caucasus Barometer data show, protection of human rights (minority rights comprised)
is not named by the population of the South Caucasus countries as one of the major issues facing
their countries; quite often, people know almost nothing about human rights. In this situation, the
Public Defenders have the possibility – both legally and culturally – to become crucial agents for
change and to contribute to the democratic development of their countries.
Although survey data suggest similar levels and dynamics of trust towards Public Defenders
in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, more detailed analysis shows that nature of trust towards
Ombudsmen is different in these countries. Quite alarmingly, the population’s trust towards Om-
budsmen has declined in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan after 2009, in spite of the development
of this institution which, at least in Georgia, has at its disposal all possible legal means to efficiently
serve as a mechanism for the protection of human rights and to contribute to the strengthening of
the “human rights culture” in their countries. Importantly, trust towards Ombudsmen is positively
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correlated with reported trust towards major governing bodies, such as Parliaments and Cabinets of
Ministers, which suggests that, to a certain extent, the population perceives Public Defenders to be
representatives of the government – even though the respective legislation is clear that this is not
the case. Better knowledge of Public Defenders’ independence from the government, as well as the
missions and the resources of this institution by the public will help strengthen the protection of
human rights and, eventually, develop human rights culture in these societies.
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95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Step 115 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper
RESPAGE -.002 .000 477.498 1 .000 .998 .998 .998
RESPSEXreg(1) .095 .003 1286.329 1 .000 1.100 1.094 1.106
STRATUMreg(1) -.420 .003 25281.894 1 .000 .657 .654 .660
RESPMARreg(1) .106 .003 1540.618 1 .000 1.111 1.105 1.117
RESPEMPLreg(1) -.036 .003 176.612 1 .000 .965 .960 .970
RESPAGE -.002 .000 477.498 1 .000 .998 .998 .998
RESPSEXreg(1) .095 .003 1286.329 1 .000 1.100 1.094 1.106
STRATUMreg(1) -.420 .003 25281.894 1 .000 .657 .654 .660
RESPMARreg(1) .106 .003 1540.618 1 .000 1.111 1.105 1.117
RESPEMPLreg(1) -.036 .003 176.612 1 .000 .965 .960 .970
RESPEDUreg(1) .221 .003 5741.080 1 .000 1.248 1.240 1.255
becriticalreg(1) -.081 .003 962.616 1 .000 .922 .918 .927
POLDIRNreg(1) -.474 .003 31966.690 1 .000 .622 .619 .626
ASSESSDEMreg(1) -.279 .003 10417.644 1 .000 .756 .752 .760
ATTDEMreg(1) -.494 .003 29627.261 1 .000 .610 .607 .614
Constant .142 .005 745.563 1 .000 1.153
Table 0.1: Variables in the Equation (Georgia).
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95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Step 115 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper
RESPAGE -.008 .000 7558.986 1 .000 .992 .992 .992
RESPSEXreg(1) .227 .003 5247.981 1 .000 1.255 1.247 1.262
STRATUMreg(1) -.027 .003 72.685 1 .000 .973 .967 .979
RESPMARreg(1) .090 .003 805.335 1 .000 1.094 1.087 1.101
RESPEMPLreg(1) .274 .003 7317.242 1 .000 1.315 1.307 1.323
RESPEDUreg(1) .004 .003 1.199 1 .274 1.004 .997 1.010
becriticalreg(1) .040 .003 160.134 1 .000 1.041 1.035 1.047
POLDIRNreg(1) -1.338 .005 62728.182 1 .000 .262 .260 .265
ASSESSDEMreg(1) -.352 .004 8238.279 1 .000 .704 .698 .709
ATTDEMreg(1) .101 .003 1114.786 1 .000 1.106 1.100 1.113
Constant .915 .008 14145.548 1 .000 2.498
Table 0.2: Variables in the Equation (Armenia).
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Step 115 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper
RESPAGE .001 .000 336.842 1 .000 1.001 1.001 1.002
RESPSEXreg(1) .222 .002 8272.908 1 .000 1.249 1.243 1.255
STRATUMreg(1) -.762 .002 110531.771 1 .000 .467 .465 .469
RESPMARreg(1) -.005 .003 3.779 1 .052 .995 .990 1.000
RESPEMPLreg(1) -.350 .003 18939.325 1 .000 .705 .701 .708
RESPEDUreg(1) .446 .002 36781.935 1 .000 1.562 1.554 1.569
becriticalreg(1) -.130 .004 1273.911 1 .000 .878 .872 .885
POLDIRNreg(1) .086 .002 1241.880 1 .000 1.090 1.084 1.095
ASSESSDEMreg(1) -.958 .003 144194.281 1 .000 .384 .382 .386
ATTDEMreg(1) .297 .002 15615.741 1 .000 1.346 1.340 1.352
Constant -.399 .005 5505.679 1 .000 .671
Table 0.3: Variables in the Equation (Azerbaijan).
15 Variable(s) entered on step 1: RESPAGE, RESPSEXreg, STRATUMreg, RESPMARreg, RESPEMPLreg, RESPE-
DUreg, becriticalreg, POLDIRNreg, ASSESSDEMreg, ATTDEMreg.
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RESPAGE Respondent’s age, measured on a ratio scale.
RESPSEXreg(1) Respondent’s sex, measured on a dichotomous scale.
STRATUMreg(1) Settlement type, originally a nominal variable with three categories:
capital, other urban settlements and rural settlements.
RESPMARreg(1) Respondent’s marital status, originally a nominal variable measured by
question A7_R of the questionnaire. xviii
RESPEMPLreg(1) Respondent’s employment status, originally a nominal variable measured
by question J1 of the questionnaire.
RESPEDUreg(1) Highest level of education obtained by the respondent; originally a nomi-
nal variable measured by question D4 of the questionnaire.
becriticalreg(1) Assessment of importance for a good citizen to be critical towards the
government, originally an ordinal variable measured by question P16_7
of the questionnaire.
POLDIRNreg(1) Assessment of which direction the respective country’s politics is devel-
oping towards; originally a nominal variable measured by question P1 of
the questionnaire.
ASSESSDEMreg(1) Assessment of democratic development of the country; originally a
nominal variable measured by question P17 of the questionnaire.
ATTDEMreg(1) Attitudes towards democratic vs. non-democratic rule; originally a nomi-
nal variable measured by question P18 of the questionnaire.
Table 0.4: Variables in the regression models.
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